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Abstract 
In this article, I discuss the debate between domain-specificity and content-generality in 
regard to the human mind. My main objective is to argue that the human mind can 
both be understood as a content-dependent machinery, as well as a general-purpose 
system that encapsulates information and manifests it accordingly. In evolutionary 
psychology a strong case is made for the mind‟s domain-specific architecture but 
assumptions of domain-general importance could also be taken into account. In 
evolutionary terms, it is argued that the mind is composed of content-dependent and 
specialized functions that have evolved in order to help humans deal with adaptive 
problems. The mind‟s evolved functionality of domain-specific systems has helped 
humans not only to survive but also to be creative in their relationships to others and the 
environment. However, advocates of behaviourist models and learning theories have 
proposed that the mind is a content-independent device which encapsulates 
information of a general nature. In this paper, domain specificity will be explained in 
terms of functional specialization, and content-generality in terms of informational 
encapsulation. My main aim will be to argue that both assumptions can be viewed in 
context-relevance to each other.   
 
Keywords: Evolutionary psychology, domain-specificity, functional specialization, 
general-purpose system, informational encapsulation, innate automaticity, integrative 
modularity. 
 
Introduction   
 
Human behaviour consists of distinguished mental abilities that relate to complex 
neural activities (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; 1994). Abilities, such as mathematical 
skillfulness, cooperation with others, cheater-detection, navigation in environment, 
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all depend on cognitive structures of specific circuitry (Gelman, 2000). Cognitive 
structures are domain-specific, modular in function, and refer to the information-
processing machinery of the human mind (Khalidi, 2001; Cosmides & Tooby, 2008). 
Charles Darwin (1859) and William James (1890) were among the first theorists who 
anticipated the domain-specific explanation of the human mind and its importance 
for the understanding of human behaviour. 
 
Domain-specificity is not the only field of explanation for the human mind. It has 
been suggested that domain-generality could also be viewed as significant (Quartz, 
2002). Domain-generality understands the mind as general-purpose cognitive system 
composed of content-independent functions. These functions are modular in nature 
and feature the structure of the mind with specialized abilities (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; 
Fodor, 2000). The case for domain-generality concentrates mainly on behaviourist 
accounts, such as the issue of learning, and how that is acquired from human 
cognition (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). In contrast, domain-specificity explains human 
behaviour not as an outcome of learning processes but as an outset of specialized 
cognitive functions. Specialization is context-dependent and dedicated to a 
content of multi-modular organization (Samuels, 2006). Learning, according to the 
domain-specificity argument, is not an issue of stimuli coming from the environment, 
but the outcome of functionally organized modules. These modules are content-
central and especially designed for skills and knowledge acquisition (Barrett & 
Kurzban, 2006; Machery, 2007).  
 
The tug-of-war between the two approaches relates to the interpretation of 
information and how this is processed by the mind. By information what is explained 
here is the content of individuals‟ knowledge, as well as their beliefs, assumptions, 
fictions, rules, norms, skills, etc. Information is seen in the form of mental 
representations which depict the material realization of it in the mind. Mental 
representations become public productions concerned with guided behaviours that 
are transmitted between individuals. Public productions can be explained as public 
representations, and include speech, gestures, writing, postures, and etc. 
Observation and imitation, although they cannot be assumed to be public 
representations, can still be included here, for they transmit information (Sperber, 
2007).      
 
This article will discuss the debate between evolutionary psychology and learning 
theories in regard to the mind. Is the mind a multi-modular system in terms of 
structure, or structure-free elements? Is the mind a modular system which explains 
that adaptive problems can be resolved by the use of a specialized cognitive 
structure, by the use of general-purpose cognitive machinery, or both?      
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Presentation of the debate: Issues of informational encapsulation and 
functional specialization 
 
The domain-specificity/domain-generality debate as to the mind‟s cognitive 
architecture originally refers to the epistemological framework of two different 
approaches:  
1. The aspect of informational encapsulation (Fodor, 2000), which refers to the 
enclosure of the mind’s cognitive structures in a massive modularity system. 
2. The aspect of content-dependent sets of computational processes expressed by 
outputs - referred to as particular domains - that are functionally specialized in 
the mind (Tooby et al., 2005; Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2007).  
 
Both accounts consider the mind as modular in function; however they approach 
modularity from different starting-points.  On the one hand, modularity is understood 
in terms of causality and functionality, independently processing information across 
all modules of the mental system; on the other, it is seen as specialized and closely 
associated to the differing information-processing abilities of each module (Okasha, 
2003).  
 
These two accounts diverge from one another, because:  
1. The one regards modularity as an outset of independent functions carried 
through by every single module. 
2. The other explains modularity from an evolutionary point of view, where modules 
are explained as content-focused, in order for adaptive problems to be identified 
and resolved (Coltheart, 1999). 
 
The domain-specificity argument for the human mind: The case for a content-focus 
assumption and its relation to informational encapsulation 
 
According to a metaphor (Horgan, 1995), the mind could compare to a Swiss army 
knife crammed with functionally specialized tools. The mind forms a system of 
information-processing devices designed by natural selection to solve adaptive 
problems (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997b; Sweller, 2006). It consists of species-typical 
adaptations presented in a biological system of incomparable heterogeneity, 
known as „the brain‟ (Richerson & Boyd, 1999; Cosmides & Tooby, 2001). 
 
In cognitive science, brain and mind refer to understandings of physical properties 
and executive functions (Oatley, 1985; Cosmides & Tooby, 1999). The brain is 
considered as a system of minicomputers dedicated to generate functionally 
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integrated behaviours (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997b; Portillo & Gleiser, 2009). The mind 
was designed by natural selection to be composed of domain-specific mechanisms 
relevant to the physical organization of the brain (Jerison, 1985; Cosmides & Tooby, 
2001). Domain-specific mechanisms are evolved adaptations of complicated 
cognitive architecture explaining the problems hunter-gatherers were facing in our 
evolutionary past (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Kanazawa, 2004).  Evolutionary 
psychology considers the brain‟s neural circuitry a valuable tool in outlining the 
modular function of the mind (Cosmides & Tooby, 1999; Bereczkei, 2000).  
 
The mind‟s composition of a large number of multi-purpose specializations explains 
that they can distinctively: 
1. deal with an information-processing adaptive problem;  
2. present neural circuitry equipped with functional particularity as to the specific 
nature of a problem;  
3. apply evolved solutions via specialized machinery engineered to win over an 
adaptive problem; 
4. Integrate knowledge on problem-relevant aspects, in accordance to the 
evolved design of the mind‟s specific functions (Cosmides & Tooby, 1999; Kennair, 
2002). 
 
The human mind is composed of a large number of domain-specific adaptations 
because natural selection is a theory of function (Jerison, 1985; Cosmides & Tooby, 
1994). For solutions to be applied to adaptive problems, cognitive functions of the 
mind have been selected for. Adaptive problems and cognitive functions are 
contingent on each other (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Macpherson, 2002). Natural 
selection forms content-rich cognitive mechanisms able to provide solutions to 
evolutionarily posed domain problems (Symons, 1992). Content-specific functions of 
the human mind infer content-dependent problem-solving. That means that 
problem-solving strategies require specific cognitive preconditions (antecedents) to 
be in place, in order true or false reasoning concomitants (consequents) to be met 
(Cosmides, 1989; Becker, 1991; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). 
 
An example explaining the domain-specificity of the human mind is the Wason‟s 
selection task which asks participants to find how the conditional rule of the premise 
If P then Q could be violated (Wason, 1966). Participants are presented with four 
cards and asked which two they should pick to see whether the rule is violated 
(Cosmides, 1989; Evans & Newstead, 1995). What participants are actually asked is 
to falsify the If P then Q rule by choosing the cards if P then not-Q (Wason & Johnson-
Laird, 1972). If P then not-Q choice is the logically correct answer, for the selection of 
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the P card unravels a non-Q value on the other side, and vice versa (Cosmides, 
1989; Griggs, 1995).  
 
Social contract versions of this task explain that human mind includes inferential 
functions at detecting cheaters (Stone et al., 2002); a social contract version of this 
task could be: If you mow the lawn I will pay you a fiver (Eysenck & Keane, 2003). This 
is because human mind recognizes the reciprocal nature of social exchange by 
possessing specialized reasoning dedicated to the detection of cheaters (Trivers, 
1971; Cosmides, 1985). Laursen and Hartup (2002) as well as Cosmides and Tooby 
(2005) argued that people look for the adaptively right answer in a social contract 
environment to detect potential rule-breakers. Social exchange interactions are 
conditional upon benefits and costs, provided that costs are less than the net 
benefits gained (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Cosmides, 1989). Social exchange is 
another form of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984), which refers to 
evolutionarily recurring relationships of human interaction (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005; 
Teboul & Cole, 2005).  
 
The Wason selection task explains evolutionarily recurring relationships in social 
contract terms regarding conditional rules that have been breached (Cosmides, 
1989; Wagner-Egger, 2007). The logic of this task means that the more explicit an 
adaptive problem, the more vividly specified and improved would be the selection 
of a mental mechanism to solve it (Williams, 1966). The mind solves adaptive 
problems via a number of special-purpose capacities, designed to confront 
challenges (Chomsky, 1980); an assumption which was also suggested by Darwin 
(1859). 
 
The mind‟s design of specific cognitive elements explains for evolutionary 
psychology the functional organization of specialized features towards problem-
identification, decision-making, and problem-solving. That means that skills and 
knowledge acquisition depend on the informational content of the articulation 
process in order for relevant solutions to be suggested. 
 
However, if this is the case, what about content of information which is: a) 
cognitively impenetrable - such as auditory or visual illusions; b) difficult to be 
articulated - such as related or not to reality; c) varied in ways of being processed by 
the mind as to the context of their constituent parts or d) consists of inputs that have 
not been fully distinguished by the cognitive system, in order for relative outputs to 
be produced. From an informational encapsulation point of view it can be 
suggested that information cannot be processed because of lack, or limited 
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availability, of mental representations produced in the mind (Sperber, 2001; Muis et 
al., 2006).  
 
The domain-general argument for the human mind: The case for a domain-
independent assumption and its relation to content-specificity 
 
Informational encapsulation assumes that the mind is a massively modular system 
subject to a massive functionality organisation (Fodor, 2000). According to this thesis, 
only peripheral systems, such as vision, are modular, whilst anything else is non-
modular, such as cognitive systems (Fodor, 1983). Encapsulation processes have 
access to only limited information, excluded from being pertinent to other outputs 
produced elsewhere in the organism. Cognitive systems are encapsulated in an all-
inclusive operation of outputs that are autonomous and totally unrelated to other 
mental systems (Sperber, 2007).  
 
Informational encapsulation is subject to: 
1. The massive modularity view of input systems; 
2. The massive functionality organisation of the mind‟s cognitive systems; 
3. General, and not central, cognitive outputs (Sperber, 2001).   
 
To understand the above, it is argued by Fodor (1983) that stimuli operate:  
1. As transducers, which convert and process signals; 
2. As input systems, which, in a massively modular way, produce inferences relevant 
to the sources inputs are admitted to; 
3. In association to general-purpose cognitive systems, both in terms of  reasoning 
and external appearance. 
 
Informational encapsulation stands in contrast to domain specificity. It argues that 
the evolution of human behaviour can be explained in terms of a mind located in a 
domain-general system of content-independent structure (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; 
Carruthers & Chamberlain, 2000). A content-independent structure has been 
proposed by learning theories that see the mind as a general-purpose machine 
useful for fitness-maximizing (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Samuels, 2006). Their main 
assumption is that the mind is a content-free system offering solutions to any fitness 
challenge (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Veenman et al., 1997).  
 
The human mind as a general-purpose computer traces its origin to the ideas of the 
„blank slate‟ (Locke, 1690; Watson, 1925) and the Standard Social Science Model 
(Degler, 1991; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). The human mind‟s content-generality 
derives from the environment and the social world. Social processes take place in 
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particular milieus without necessarily being subject to individual transactions 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Kaufmann & Clément, 2007).  
 
Researchers describe domain-generality as learning, imitation, rationalization, 
induction, intelligence (Cosmides & Tooby, 1999; Saffran & Thiessen, 2007). The social 
world, according to this account, is the external factor and an individual‟s 
psychological and physical fitness depend on it (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Kaufmann 
& Clément, 2007).  
 
According to understanding, the social world is alternatively viewed as „culture‟ 
assumed to be maximizing an individual‟s fitness by: 
1. Being socially learnt and passed on from generation to generation;  
2. Forming the learning process of one‟s adult life, for every human mental activity is 
primarily content-independent;   
3. Being represented via intra-group similarities (Berger, 1966; Cosmides & Tooby, 
1994). 
 
The general-purpose assumption asserts that, whether an adaptive problem has 
already been or hasn‟t been encountered, it is possible for a solution to be 
suggested (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Gratch & Chien, 1996).  
 
However, in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness), when our ancestors 
were confronted with adaptive problems, they were making use of evolved 
cognitive mechanisms (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Evans & Zarate, 2000). The use of 
such mechanisms over evolutionary time assisted them in a consistent way to face 
different situations (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Anderson, 1990). Cooperative 
interactions, such as helping others, or competitive strategies do refer to information 
processing of conditionals, regulated by cognitive designs to evoke specialized and 
content-focused functions (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997a; Wagner-Egger, 2007). One 
such cognitive design is language: To be acquired there is the need for evolutionarily 
recurrent mental activity which should be domain-sensitive (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; 
Storey et al., 1997). If the opposite is true, it means that communication expectations 
cannot be met, because they lack functionally distinguished mental architecture 
promoting the learning of a language (Chomsky, 1980).    
 
The general-purpose machinery of the mind predicts that any activity performed is 
dependent on functions of experience and familiarity which promote fitness-
maximization. Fitness-maximization is the outcome of content-independent 
experiences, whether these relate to evolutionary adaptations or not (Buller & 
Hardcastle, 2000; Cosmides & Tooby, 2008). Content-general computation is the 
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case for such an assumption of the human mind, without the need for functional 
specialization to be involved (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Duchaine et al., 2001). 
 
However, if the mind is content-free and independent of any specialized cognitive 
activity, what about complicated structures, such as face recognition (Bruce & 
Young, 1986)? Face recognition ability is explained as composed of distinguished 
specialized structures of content-specific functions in the brain which distinctively 
recognize a face, facial features, or the ID of an individual (Boyer & Barrett, 2005; 
Eysenck & Keane, 2005). If the content-free assumption about the human mind is 
true, then the rest of our biology should also be that way, such as having one sense 
organ instead of five (Gallistel, 2000). 
 
The example from face recognition supports not only the domain-specificity 
argument but the informational encapsulation view as well. Physiologically speaking, 
the term „encapsulation‟ can be found in many instances: for example, we say 
‘encapsulation of tendons in membranous sheaths’. Face recognition is dependent 
on a number of neuron cells which encapsulate information for face recognition 
through the right middle fusiform gyrus. Membranous sheaths can be found in many 
parts of the human body including the brain. Tendons are enclosed in membranes; 
however, tendons and membranes are not operating in the same way. A tendon 
functions in association to an inelastic tissue connecting a muscle with its bony 
attachment; whereas a membranous sheath is the covering sheet operating as an 
outer layer that protects the tendon.  
 
Although face recognition is the outcome, it may also be the informational 
encapsulation of a number of different cognitive processes. For instance, not all 
parts, such as face features or the name of the individual, are located in the same 
brain areas. Face features and name recognition are found in the 
parahippocampal, lingual, and peri-calcarine areas, meaning that cognitive abilities 
do not operate on their own. They operate in association to other brain locations 
referred to a number of different neural processes. Interestingly enough, cognitive 
abilities can be found encapsulated in many content-specific neural structures 
aiming at producing differentiated cognitive operations.  
 
Domain-specificity can therefore be viewed as the content-dependent capability of 
the mind, however independent of the interaction resulting when information is 
processed through a number of different outputs (Gallistel, 1999). Having a cognitive 
system specialized for the A or B domain does not mean that such cognitive system 
could not stand available or “co-opted” for “evolutionarily novel activities” (Boyer & 
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Barrett, 2005: 99); i.e. for activities outside the remit of an already content-
dependent structure, activities of an encapsulation-informed template.     
 
Discussion: Context-relevance approaches between informational 
encapsulation and functional specialization 
  
The human mind is not a general-purpose fitness-maximizing computer. It is 
especially designed for cognitive functions contingent upon domain-specific 
structures so that adaptive challenges could be faced. Such challenges cannot be 
statistically systematic in terms of fitness. This is because processes of action on fitness 
cannot be carefully assessed due to a different representation of genes over 
succeeding generations. On the other hand, the human mind may consist of 
content-independent domains as well. Such domains may present a functional 
modular system of a general-purpose applicability, such as detecting cheaters not 
only in interrelationships but also in abstract social endeavours (Veenman et al., 
1997). As an evolutionary psychologist, though I regard the mind as functionally 
specialized, I nevertheless consider that such a thesis is one-sided. I would think that 
what Fodor conceives of as informational encapsulation can be related to the issue 
of functional specialization, so that convergence and not divergence is the case.  
 
We know that the precedence of modularity impacts to the generation of 
information-integrated systems. Information-integrated systems employ independent 
functions of cognitive architecture in order for elements of behaviour and action to 
become manifest. This is an important thesis for both functional specialization and 
informational encapsulation, because „behaviour‟ and „action‟ are functionally 
dependent on human cognition. Therefore, domain-specificity and domain-
generality are issues of context-relevance to each other.  
 
Context-relevance is the point of convergence between functional specialization 
and informational encapsulation, for it refers to the aspect of innate automaticity. 
The aspect of innate automaticity explains that information can both be subject to a 
specific content as well as to modular functions of general-purpose nature. Innate 
automaticity can also be understood in terms of an internal working process in the 
mind, where sensory information is processed as an input resulting in particular 
representations (outputs). Representations are demonstrated via templates of 
content-specific behaviours. Context-relevance between domain-specificity and 
domain-generality explains the mind‟s cognitive architecture in terms of integrative 
modularity. By that I mean that innate functions and external processes are 
dependent on one another. They are dependent not only in the form of devices that 
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process specialized informational content, but also in devices of a content-
independent structure. The latter refers to the comprehension of the information 
received which is independent of the content that information „needs‟ in order to be 
processed.  
 
An example to understand the above could be computers that are regarded as 
entities of general-purpose machinery. Computers need hardware and software for 
their operating systems, programs, accessories, etc. Next to such general-purpose 
machinery a number of distinctively characterized sub-mechanisms composed of 
smaller functional units are attached, all of which assist the operation of the entire 
system. For, what could be the use of a general-purpose machinery without the 
need for smaller functional entities, so that the system could be up-and-running? 
None! All distinct functional units, or modules, depend on the general-purpose 
machinery, and vice versa.  
 
Modularity of the mind is both domain-specific and domain-general: Human 
cognition is indeed a domain-general system; nevertheless, it is distinctively divided 
into units-modules of a special content without which the mind wouldn’t be able to 
properly function. All units-modules are massive in their composition, consisting of 
even much greater sub-units and modules. Such composition pinpoints to the 
massive modularity argument, for it implies: 
1. An „oceanic structure‟, as to the constituents of the mind‟s modular functionality; 
2. Components that operate independently to the content of each other. 
  
In such an explanation, massive modularity underlines that both informational 
encapsulation and functional specialization belong to the same evolved cognitive 
architecture. Such evolved cognitive architecture was selected for, in order for 
adaptive problems to be effectively confronted (Barrett, 2008).  
 
The current understanding about modularity, by evolutionary psychology, is 
approached in terms of information-processing. However, evolutionary psychology 
needs to re-examine its domain-specificity assumptions, by explaining massive 
modularity as both functionally specialized and information-encapsulated.  
 
The human mind is composed of domain-specific and domain-general cognitive 
features designed to deal with the structural content of evolutionarily recurrent 
situations. That means that the mind by being equipped with a vast number of 
cognitive mechanisms - context-relevant to each other - is able to apply solutions 
that can both be content-dependent and content-independent. The human mind is 
a domain-specific system composed of species-typical adaptations which refer to: 
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1. Our mental architecture, which is presented with a design that tackles and solves 
target problems (such as resolving conflicts); 
2. The ability to process information that is functionally specific, in order for everyday 
requisites to be attended (such as satisfying nutritional needs); 
3. Natural selection, as the designer of domain-specific mechanisms, consisting of a 
variety of cognitive specializations, both context and content-oriented (such as 
helping con-specifics in a time of need). 
 
From an evolutionary psychology perspective, the context-relevance argument in 
regard to the mind as a general-purpose computational system suggests that: 
1. The more significant an adaptive problem, the more vividly natural selection had 
designed cognitive mechanisms to quintessentially deal with it, such as avoiding 
predators, or caring for family members. 
2. Regulation of action, in a content-dependent manner, is equally important to the 
general-purpose use of knowledge acquisition. The use of particular knowledge is 
effective only if the regulation of action is subject to the knowledge gained; such 
as someone knowing how to face cheaters. 
3. Human cognition could be both a by-product of imitating the social world, and a 
domain-specific structure with distinct capabilities. Either way, a solution to a 
problem such as comprehending costs and benefits in social contract settings is 
subject to familiarity issues in a given environment. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Evolutionary psychology explains domain-specific mechanisms of the human mind 
that have evolved to solve adaptive problems. These mechanisms are specialized 
cognitive activities functionally integrated to face challenges posed in relevant 
niches. Their functional specialization has been selected for to capacitate and guide 
human behaviour against everyday difficulties. In contrast to that, domain-general 
and content-independent assumptions regard the human mind as a cognitive 
derivative of experiences and socialization, focused on fitness-maximization. The 
basic hypothesis for such a consideration is that the mind is content-free of any 
domain-specific mechanism. The main assumption behind context-generality lies 
with the aspect of informational encapsulation. Informational encapsulation is 
interpreted as the function of outputs autonomously operating, and totally 
disassociated from other mental systems.  
 
Although both approaches claim to be divergent, I have shown in this paper that a 
fruitful convergence between both could also be the case. Such convergence can 
be understood in terms of context-relevance between informational encapsulation 
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and functional specialization. Both ideas refer to issues of information processing, 
whether in terms of a mind as general-purpose device or as content-dependent 
machinery. In this paper I have argued that the mind can be explained both as a 
general-purpose and content-dependent computer, for it refers to actions and 
behaviours of specific and general content. Context-relevance between both 
considerations explains also aspects of innate automaticity and integrative 
modularity. Inputs and their resulting outputs demonstrate generally- processed 
information, as well as information being processed by individual parts of human 
cognition.  
 
Evolutionary psychology, in its interpretation of the mind, needs to consider the 
context-relevance assumption as valid, in order for a common framework between 
information encapsulation and functional specialization to be introduced. 
Evolutionary psychology, by considering the latter, expands informational 
encapsulation and functional specialization towards an integrative evolutionary 
approach to the human mind. Such approach could explain the human mind as an 
operating system of context-relevant circuitry based on a content-relevant general-
purpose machinery.   
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